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Abstract 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the Jamaican financial sector’s share of GDP more than 
doubled following an aggressive market liberalization undertaken without corresponding 
increases in regulation or supervision. When one of the largest financial-industrial 
conglomerates failed in 1995, the government created an asset management company with 
special powers to resolve the institution. In 1997, after another significant failure, the 
government established the Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC). FINSAC 
carried a broader mandate to both recapitalize and restructure troubled financial 
institutions and to take over and manage their nonperforming assets (NPAs). The 
organization possessed no special powers to compel the targets of its interventions. Instead, 
FINSAC negotiated with troubled institutions on a voluntary basis. Most agreements saw 
FINSAC purchase shares in financial institutions to provide capital and to obtain veto power 
over management decisions; some arrangements simply saw FINSAC purchase NPAs. Within 
FINSAC, two units managed a combined portfolio of NPAs equivalent to at least J$89 billion 
($2.36 billion). The two units had recovered or sold most of this portfolio by December 2001 
but recouped only 35% of the NPL portfolio’s face value. 
Keywords: Jamaica, asset management companies, asset purchase programs, FINSAC   
 
1 This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project 
modules considering broad-based asset management company programs. 
Cases are available from the Journal of Financial Crises at https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-
financial-crises/. 





At a Glance  
Jamaica’s late-1990s banking crisis 
happened against the backdrop of 
economic stagnation. Successive 
development loans failed to drive growth, 
and the debt became more burden than 
engine. Governing parties attempted to 
liberalize public enterprises, taxation, and 
trade. The reforms did not sustain growth, 
but trade and exchange rate liberalization 
caused inflation to top 80% in 1991. 
Liberalization also unleashed the financial 
sector: between 1987 and 1994, its share of 
GDP grew from 7% to 16%. But this growth 
was not met with corresponding changes to 
supervision or regulation. In fact, 
regulatory systems spurred this growth. 
Conglomerates—composed of banks, 
nonbank lenders, and insurance 
agencies—emerged in the early 1990s to 
exploit differential regulation and taxation 
among the subsidiaries. Building societies 
faced no reserve requirements or 
supervision; as a result, their ranks swelled 
from six to 32 and their assets from J$3 
billion (US$81.3 million3) to J$29 billion 
(US$785.9 million) over the same period. 
Jamaican observers note how domestic institutions financed office buildings and hotels, 
vacant monuments to the country’s real estate bubble. Conglomerates ventured into real 
estate partially to offset declining demand for fixed-income assets such as life insurance 
policies. When those investments failed to provide expected cash flow, subsidiaries raised 
money from one of the conglomerate’s banks. These loans strained domestic bank liquidity, 
and depositors feared for their savings. When these problems were made public, it was too 
late. Bonnick, who served as executive chairman of the Financial Sector Adjustment 
Company (FINSAC), wrote “that what was described as a liquidity problem due to the 
 
3 In 1998, J$36.90 = US$1 (World Bank 2000). 
Summary of Key Terms 
Purpose: “To resolve the problems of solvency and 
liquidity being experienced by the financial sector” 
(FINSAC, n.d.g) 
Launch Dates Launch: January 29, 1997 
Wind-down Dates Began in 2002 but continued 
through 2018 as a party to 
litigation 
Size and Type of NPL 
Problem 
J$74 billion (J$33 billion face 
value) of commercial loans 
and real-estate-backed asset 
Program Size Not specified at outset 
Eligible Institutions  All domestic financial 
institutions 
Closed- and open-bank 
Usage J$89 billion portfolio of NPLs 
and other NPAs 
Outcomes 35% of NPL’s face value 
recovered (15% with 
interest); J$15 billion of 
other assets recovered 
Ownership Structure Government-owned 
Notable Features Sold NPLs to private collector 
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mismatch of assets and liabilities was in fact a problem of insolvency—potential, borderline, 
and in some cases substantial.” In 1995, Jamaica created Financial Institution Services (FIS) 
to handle the first failure of a conglomerate. By this time, the deposit liabilities of commercial 
banks had ballooned from J$10.5 billion to J$89 billion in the span of five years. FIS, an asset 
management company with special powers to intervene in financial institutions, intervened 
in a second conglomerate a year later. 
But the government decided to pursue a more comprehensive approach. On January 29, 
1997, FINSAC incorporated under the Companies Act. This gave it no special powers to 
intervene in foundering institutions; instead, it would have to negotiate with each of the 150–
200 financial institutions it assisted. FINSAC would then seek authorization from the 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) before hammering out final 
agreements in court with creditors and shareholders of troubled institutions. These 
agreements varied from institution to institution and could range from simply purchasing 
nonperforming assets (NPAs) to facilitating mergers to purchasing majority control. Where 
FINSAC purchased a company’s assets or capital, it usually paid in government-guaranteed 
bonds it issued. The country’s high debt load determined this method of financing; “the 
bonds could be issued quickly without going immediately to Parliament to raise government 
debt ceilings”. 
With these bonds, the FINSAC acquired a J$74 billion portfolio of nonperforming loans 
(NPLs). It acquired other assets as well—mostly real estate, but also movable property such 
as artwork. Two divisions within FINSAC, the Loan Recovery Unit (LRU) and the Asset 
Disposal Unit (ADU), handled both types of NPAs, including assets of the two conglomerates 
originally managed by FIS. Loan recoveries proceeded slowly—only J$5.7 billion was 
recovered by 2001. FINSAC sold the balance to an American bank in January 2002; under the 
sale agreement, Jamaica received a portion of loan recoveries beyond a J$1.1 billion advance. 
FINSAC found more success in asset disposal. By 2003, it had sold 98% of its residential real 
estate, 75% of its commercial real estate, and J$3.9 billion in other assets. FINSAC ceased 
operations in July 2002, but litigation relating to its liabilities to depositors kept the minister 
of finance from dissolving FINSAC. 
Summary Evaluation 
FINSAC’s competing objectives complicated its operations and evaluation. As a rehabilitator 
of insolvent financial institutions, the World Bank noted that, “as of June 2000, commercial 
banks, near banks, and building societies had less than half the ratio of NPLs to total loans 
compared to two years earlier.” However, the World Bank also wrote that FINSAC’s 
dependence on negotiations meant that assets were often acquired at face value, which 
allowed shareholders to avoid losses at the expense of public resources. The LRU was largely 
unable to recover these amounts in a timely manner, recovering J$5.9 billion from a J$74 
billion (J$33 billion book value, plus unpaid interest) portfolio. In 2002, FINSAC sold the 
remainder of its NPLs to a private company for a US$23 million (J$1.1 billion based on 2002 
exchange rates) advance; the company also committed to share with FINSAC a portion of any 
funds it recovered from debtors. The private company reported that it had collected US$194 
million as of January 2011; as of March 2012, the company had paid Jamaica US$50.8 million 
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since the advance. Together with the initial payment and earlier recoveries, FINSAC received 
about 35% of its loan portfolio’s J$33 billion face value, or 15% of its value when including 
interest. The ADU found somewhat more success, selling most of its real estate, the largest 
other category of outstanding assets. 
Figure 1: FINSAC Asset Management Endowments and Recoveries 
 
Initial Size Recovered Recovery Rate 
Loan Recovery Unit 
J$74 billion (face value of 
J$33 billion) 
J$11.4 billion4 
15% (35% of face 
value) 
Asset Disposal Unit Unknown J$15 billion N/A 
 
Sources: FINSAC 2002, 3; Thompson 2011; World Bank 2003, 9. 
  
 
4 Author’s calculation: J$5.9 billion recovered outright + J$1.1 billion advance + J$4.4 billion from US$194 
million in recoveries. J$4.4 billion figure from June 2011 spot exchange rate. 
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Financial Sector Adjustment Company: Jamaica Context 
GDP 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
US$8.375 billion in 1997 
US$8.763 billion in 1998 
GDP per capita 
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD) 
US$3,241 in 1997 
US$3,359 in 1998 
Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior debt) 
Not rated in 1997 
Moody’s: Baa3 in 1998 
Size of banking system US$2,633.1 million in 1997 
US$2,867.3 million in 1998 
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP  31.44% in 1997 
32.72% in 1998 
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial 
system 
Data not available in 1997 
Data not available in 1998 
Five-bank concentration of banking system Data not available in 1997 
Data not available in 1998 
Foreign involvement in banking system Data not available in 1997 
Data not available in 1998 
Government ownership of banking system Data not available in 1997 
Data not available in 1998 
Existence of deposit insurance None in 1997 
Up to J$200,000 in 1998 via 
Jamaica Deposit Insurance 
Corporation 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank Deposit 
Insurance Dataset; Escobar et al. 1999, 30. 
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Key Design Decisions 
1. Part of a Package: Jamaica unveiled FINSAC as a “comprehensive approach” after 
the narrow approach of FIS.  
The government’s first strategy for resolving failed institutions aimed to close them, dispose 
of their assets, and pay their creditors. FIS was not charged with bank restructuring or 
recapitalization (Escobar et al. 1999). However, in 1996, analysis by the government and 
international financial institutions revealed much deeper problems in the establishments 
known to be troubled. Meanwhile, institutions thought to be healthy reported problems 
stemming from their relationships to troubled lenders and investors such as insurance 
companies. After multiple banks needed liquidity support from the Bank of Jamaica, the 
government decided that the financial sector needed more complex interventions than asset 
management (Bonnick 1998). Taking FIS’ approach would have meant accepting the failures 
of Jamaica’s largest domestic institutions as its finance sector had doubled in its share of the 
country’s output. 
As the liquidity crisis hit, the government announced complete coverage of deposits, 
pensions, and insurance policies (Escobar et al. 1999). To handle Jamaica’s failed and failing 
financial institutions, the minister of finance (Davies 1997a) announced FINSAC as a 
“comprehensive approach involving financial assistance, restructuring of companies and 
introduction of new management, together with appropriate regulatory legislation.”  
This approach contrasted with those that split the responsibilities of an intervening entity 
along functional lines. One body could manage NPAs, one could facilitate restructuring, 
another could provide capital injections. In Jamaica’s case, FINSAC handled all the functions 
of rehabilitating troubled institutions (Bonnick 1998). As a result, the Loan Recovery and 
Asset Disposal units may not have been involved with each agreement. Other times, they may 
have been the only relevant divisions, as FINSAC peeled off an institution’s NPLs without 
taking ownership (Escobar et al. 1999). Jamaica’s minister of finance (Davies 1997b) listed 
seven objectives for FINSAC: 
(1) “Address issues concerning liquidity and solvency of banking and insurance 
institutions. 
(2) Address the weakness in financial management that has been partly responsible for 
the difficulties in the sector. 
(3) Over the long term, improve the efficiency of the sector in mobilizing and allocating 
financial resources in the economy, and enhance the viability and profitability by 
restructuring the sector as well as conglomerates and firms within it. 
(4) Establish an incentive framework favouring better management and increased 
vigilance by shareholders. 
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(5) Create a desirable environment for investors to re-capitalize the institutions while 
keeping to a minimum the public sector's role in capitalizing to a minimum of short 
duration. 
(6) Strengthen the supervision of the sector with specific focus on conglomerates. 
(7) Avoid and minimize the extent to which the public sector protection of depositors, 
policyholders and pension schemes is seen as relieving managers of the need for 
prudence and depositors of the responsibility for being selective in the placement 
of their funds.” 
The country also pursued other reforms to its financial system. In 1997, Jamaica enacted 
amendments to its Banking Act, Financial Institutions Act, Building Societies Act, and 
Industrial and Provident Societies Act, which regulate banks and nonbank lenders. This 
legislation set capital and liquidity requirements and began to align Jamaica’s regulatory 
framework with recommendations by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. In 
March 1998, the legislature passed a Deposit Insurance Act, limiting deposit insurance to 
J$200,000 (Escobar et al. 1999). 
2. Legal Authority: The Ministry of Finance incorporated FINSAC under the 
Companies Act.  
The Companies Act was Jamaica’s general incorporation statute (Companies Act 2005). No 
documents suggest that the Ministry of Finance required legislation to establish businesses 
under the Companies Act. 
3. Special Powers: Jamaica did not grant FINSAC any special powers or legal 
authority.  
Its incorporation under the Companies Act meant that FINSAC lacked the special powers 
(World Bank 2000) given to FIS. Where FIS assisted the judicial system in investigating fraud 
by bank managers, and pursued civil litigation against bank shareholders and directors, 
FINSAC was more conciliatory. It “serve[d] as the executive arm of the Ministry of Finance 
and Planning” (Davies 1997b) and was unable to intervene without the ministry’s 
authorization. When it did intervene, it did so by negotiation (World Bank 2000). For 
example, the minister of finance (Davies 1997a) described FINSAC’s rehabilitation of 
Century Financial Entities, a failed Jamaican conglomerate, in a four-step process: 
(1) FINSAC, BOJ, the Ministry of Finance, and Century agreed on how FINSAC would 
acquire ownership in Century[;] 
(2) A court provisionally approved this arrangement[;] 
(3) Century’s creditors agreed on how to recover the conglomerate’s liabilities[; and] 
(4) The court sanctioned the agreement. 
347
Jamaica Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC)—Loan Recovery and Asset Disposal Units Runkel
With large conglomerates, FINSAC often brokered agreements that saw it purchase at least 
25% of ownership to obtain veto power over management (Escobar et al. 1999, 13 and table 
3). 
4. Mandate: FINSAC’s Loan Recovery Unit and Asset Disposal Unit carried a specific 
charter within the larger organization.  
FINSAC (n.d.c) established two units to: 
• Speedily dispose of assets acquired through the Government of 
Jamaica’s intervention in the financial sector. 
• Rehabilitate non-performing loans acquired by FINSAC. 
• Oversee the divestment process by intervened institutions, which undertake 
their own disposal of assets. 
• Efficiently manage and maintain, until sale, all such assets. 
However, the Ministry of Finance (Davies 1997b) also charged FINSAC as a whole with 
several other objectives. While the objectives of the LRU and ADU encouraged it to minimize 
losses, some of FINSAC’s overarching objectives encouraged it to take risks to address 
market dysfunction, putting FINSAC at odds with itself (Escobar et al. 1999). 
5. Communication: FINSAC maintained a comprehensive website. 
FINSAC’s was the earliest website of the asset management companies surveyed for this 
case series. It pictured its board of directors and executive management, described its 
institutional roles, and displayed its financial statements (FINSAC, n.d.a; n.d.b; n.d.c; 
Deloitte & Touche 2000). The minister of finance also gave presentations announcing 
FINSAC and its evolving role in the Jamaican financial crisis (Davies 1997a; 1997b), though 
documents surveyed indicated little role for FINSAC management during its early days. 
6. Ownership Structure: The government of Jamaica owned FINSAC. 
FINSAC operated under the Companies Act, with the government Jamaica as the holder of all 
J$132 billion of FINSAC’s 2001 capital (Deloitte & Touche 2002, sec. 10). 
7. Governance/Administration: FINSAC was overseen by a board consisting of 
management, political appointees, and representatives from the Bank of Jamaica.  
FINSAC’s board of directors was appointed by the minister of finance (FINSAC, n.d.e). Its 
original board consisted of the BOJ governor; the BOJ deputy governor in charge of 
supervision; the managing directors of FINSAC as well as FIS; and some political appointees 
drawn from law, labor, and academia (Davies 1997a). An outside financial services firm 
audited financial statements (Deloitte & Touche 2002). 
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Within FINSAC, two divisions managed assets—the Asset Disposal Unit and the Loan 
Recovery Unit—and further subdivided the operations and set policies such as those 
prohibiting sale to relatives of FINSAC employees (FINSAC n.d.b) and those governing loan 
forgiveness (FINSAC n.d.e). 
Outside of FINSAC, the Parliament launched a Commission of Enquiry in 2008 to investigate 
the corporation’s debt recoveries (Virtue 2019). However, the commission offered little 
oversight. After failing to publish a report for several years, the government denied the 
Commission’s request for more funding. 
8. Size: The LRU and ADU were not subject to any cap in size and received assets as 
FINSAC grew. 
Since FINSAC continued to intervene in companies after the LRU and ADU were established 
in 1998, they did not receive all J$89 billion in NPAs at one time. 
9. Funding Source: FINSAC was largely government funded.  
When FINSAC was created, it received J$2.3 billion from the Ministry of Finance. It funded 
asset purchases with government-guaranteed bonds. FINSAC’s bond-financing strategy 
bypassed legislative constraints on public borrowing (Bonnick 1998). This allowed it to 
quickly deliver liquidity to troubled institutions but also allowed FINSAC to saddle the 
country with outstanding bonds that equaled 44% of GDP in March 2001 (World Bank 2001), 
including J$27 billion in capitalized interest (Deloitte & Touche 1999; 2000; 2001; 2002). 
The government forgave this debt in 2002, converting the debt to equity on FINSAC’s balance 
sheet (Deloitte & Touche 2002). Of the J$132 billion FINSAC listed as contributed capital in 
2001, J$113 billion represented the retirement of FINSAC debt by the government. The 
government of Jamaica issued local registered stock, a direct obligation of the government, 
to replace the outstanding FINSAC bonds on the balance sheets of financial institutions 
(Deloitte & Touche 2002; Government of Jamaica 2003). 
Jamaica also received two US$75 million Bank Restructuring and Debt Management Program 
Adjustment Loans from the World Bank. The government used some of the first loan to repay 
FINSAC bonds (Government of Jamaica 2003), while portions of both loans supported 
Jamaica’s asset management planning and organization (World Bank 2003).  
10. Eligible Institutions: All Jamaica-based financial institutions were eligible to 
participate on a voluntary basis. 
FINSAC’s chair noted that: “The troubled banks were all domestically owned and controlled; 
all the domestically owned and controlled banks were troubled” (Bonnick 1998). But 
troubled institutions were not required to accept an intervention (Escobar et al. 1999). 
Nonetheless, FINSAC engaged more than 150 companies (Chen-Young 1998), including 
banks, building societies, and insurers (Escobar et al. 1999). 
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11. Eligible Assets: FINSAC acquired J$74 billion in largely commercial NPLs and at 
least J$15 billion in other assets.  
FINSAC did not disaggregate its inherited portfolio by type of assets or by the type of 
institution from which it acquired those assets. In June 2001, four years after FINSAC began 
debt recoveries, the LRU made public the composition of its outstanding loan portfolio. It 
noted 23,512 loans totaling J$18 billion; 74% of principal outstanding came from 1,514 
commercial loans, with the rest split between credit cards and miscellaneous loans (FINSAC, 
n.d.a). 
FINSAC acquired NPLs both as an end in itself and as a matter of course when acquiring or 
restructuring a financial institution (World Bank 2000). Borrowers often posted real estate 
to collateralize their loans. When loans soured, the burst real estate bubble meant that much 
of this collateral was also overvalued (Bonnick 1998). In addition to real estate—the largest 
category of miscellaneous assets—FINSAC’s portfolio consisted of vehicles, artwork, and 
other movable property (World Bank 2003). 
12. Acquisition - Mechanics: FINSAC acquired assets in exchange for bonds it issued. 
With public debt already at 103% of GDP in March 1995 (World Bank 2000), Jamaica’s 
legislature would have had to authorize any increase in the debt ceiling to intervene in the 
financial sector in a significant way (Bonnick 1998), while government-guaranteed bonds 
were not subject to the country’s debt ceiling. After exhausting a J$6.3 billion allocation of 
cash from the government (Davies 1997a), FINSAC issued bonds mostly carrying interest 
rates 1% above Jamaican treasury bills (World Bank 2000). 
13. Acquisition - Pricing: FINSAC acquired assets at face value. 
The World Bank (2000) considered the face value purchase price as a feature of FINSAC’s 
dependence on negotiation for intervention. It said that the purchase amounted to a transfer 
of public resources to private shareholders. 
14. Management and Disposal: FINSAC rescheduled or restructured many loans but 
ultimately disposed of much of its NPL portfolio by sale to a private American debt 
collector; it sold its other NPAs. 
The LRU sought a debt workout that would yield the highest value while accounting for the 
potential for success (FINSAC n.d.e). As of June 2001, it had restructured or rescheduled 
J$10.4 billion of FINSAC’s NPLs (FINSAC, n.d.f). LRU management had the power to write 
down the—often substantial—interest owed if debtors paid the loan principal. However, 
partial and full debt forgiveness was usually approved only by FINSAC’s board or the Credit 
Committee. The Credit Committee existed somewhere between LRU management and the 
FINSAC board and handled recovery plans for loans larger than J$5 million (FINSAC, n.d.e). 
Loan recoveries proceeded slowly. As of 2002, the LRU had only recovered J$5.9 billion of 
the J$74 billion (J$33 billion book value plus interest) NPL portfolio it acquired (FINSAC 
2002). Two World Bank loans supported FINSAC in the planning and sale of its NPLs to the 
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US-based Beal Bank (World Bank 2003), which ultimately resold this debt to the US-based 
Jamaica Redevelopment Foundation (Thompson 2014). The 2002 sale consisted of a US$23 
million advance followed by a percentage of Beal Bank’s collections (FINSAC 2002). FINSAC 
received public criticism over Jamaica Redevelopment Foundation’s continued pursuit of 
debtors into the 2010s, the sale of FINSAC’s debts to a foreign debt collector, and the 
continued application of interest to principal amounts (Miles 2017). 
Sales of FINSAC’s other assets totaled J$15 billion as of 2003. This represented nearly its 
entire portfolio of residential real estate, 75% of its commercial real estate, and J$3.9 billion 
in other assets (World Bank 2003). It did not disclose what it paid for such assets; it may 
have seized—instead of purchased—them since borrowers posted real estate as collateral 
for many loans (Bonnick 1998). 
15. Timeframe: The government intended FINSAC to operate for five to seven years 
from 1997, but litigation kept FINSAC from legally dissolving through 2018. 
The minister of finance (Davies 1997b) originally intended FINSAC to operate for five to 
seven years after beginning operations in 1997, with asset disposal and loan recovery 
extending past the five years allotted for direct interventions in financial institutions. FINSAC 
did not establish the LRU until September 1998 (FINSAC, n.d.c). By 2001, FINSAC’s only 
remaining activities were privatization of some intervened institutions, the sale of NPLs, and 
the sale of one hotel (Jamaica Gleaner 2001). FINSAC’s legal interests in continuing concerns 
kept it legally alive, though defunct, into 2021, as it was a party to several ongoing court cases 
(Collinder 2018) and owned majority stakes in companies (Loop News 2021). 
  
351
Jamaica Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC)—Loan Recovery and Asset Disposal Units Runkel
References and Key Program Documents 
Program Summaries 
(Bonnick 1998) Bonnick, Gladstone. October 28, 1998. “Storm in a Teacup or Crisis in 
Jamaica’s Financial Sector.” Adlith Brown Memorial Lecture 14, delivered at the XXX Annual 
Conference of the Caribbean Centre for Monetary Studies, University of the West Indies,  St. 
Augustine, Trinidad and Tobago.  
Account of the origins and development of Jamaica’s financial crisis by FINSAC’s first chair. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/storm-teacup-or-crisis-jamaicas-financial-sector. 
Implementation Documents 
(Deloitte & Touche 1999)  Deloitte & Touche. March 31, 1999. “Auditors’ Report to the 
Members of FINSAC Limited.” In Annual Report 1999, by Financial Sector Adjustment 
Company, 37–71. Kingston, Jamaica: Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC).  
Financial statements detailing FINSAC’s debts to the Government of Jamaica (later converted 
to equity).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/auditors-report-members-finsac-limited. 
(Deloitte & Touche 2000)  Deloitte & Touche. 2000. “Financial Statements.” FINSAC. 
Financial statements detailing FINSAC’s debts to the Government of Jamaica (later converted 
to equity).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17268. 
(Deloitte & Touche 2001)  Deloitte & Touche. 2001. Financial Statement. FINSAC. 
Financial statements detailing FINSAC’s debts to the Government of Jamaica (later converted 
to equity).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17269. 
(Deloitte & Touche 2002)  Deloitte & Touche. October 18, 2002. Financial Statement. 
FINSAC. 
Financial statements detailing FINSAC’s debts to the Government of Jamaica (later converted 
to equity).  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17270. 
(FINSAC, n.d.a)  FINSAC. no date. “Debt Collection Schedules.” Loan Recovery Unit. 
Financial Sector Adjustment Company. Accessed December 14, 2020.  
Web page detailing FINSAC assets recovered and outstanding as of 2001.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17271. 
Legal/Regulatory Guidance 
(Companies Act 2005)  “Companies Act.” February 1, 2005.  




The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 2
Media Stories 
(Collinder 2018)  Collinder, Avia. August 8, 2018. “Court Cases Complicate Finsac Wind-
Up.” Gleaner. Jamaica, W.I., sec. Business.  
Newspaper article detailing litigation involving FINSAC.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17272. 
(Jamaica Gleaner 2001)  “FINSAC to Begin Winding Down.” January 21, 2001, sec. 
Business. 
Newspaper article describing FINSAC’s complicated exit process.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17274. 
(Loop News 2021)  “Ciboney Says No Material Cause Linked to Share Price Increase.” 
March 2, 2021, sec. Business.  
Article describing the lingering presence of FINSAC in private companies.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17320. 
(Seaga 2018)  Seaga, Edward. July 29, 2018. “How the Financial Crash of the 1990s Happened 
and Why.” Jamaica Observer, sec. News.  
Former Jamaican Prime Minister’s published account of the origins of Jamaica’s financial crisis. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17321. 
(Thompson 2011)  Thompson, McPherse. June 22, 2011. “US$194m FINSAC Haul - 47% of 
US$366m Debt Outstanding.” Jamaica Gleaner. Jamaica, W.I., sec. Business.  
Newspaper article describing Beal Bank’s debt collection activities.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17322. 
(Thompson 2014) Thompson, McPherse. March 5, 2014. “JRF Proposes Finsac Buyout.” 
Jamaica Gleaner, sec. Business.  
Newspaper article giving more details on debt recovery by the asset manager which bought 
FINSAC NPLs.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17338. 
(Virtue 2019)  Virtue, Erica. January 20, 2019. “‘Not One Cent More for FINSAC Report’ 
- Gov’t Takes Hard Line in the Face of a Request for More Money.” Jamaica Gleaner.  
Newspaper article describing the history of the FINSAC Commission of Enquiry.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17340. 
Press Releases/Announcements 
(FINSAC, n.d.b)  FINSAC. no date. “Asset Disposal Unit.” Financial Sector Adjustment 
Company. Accessed December 14, 2020.  




Jamaica Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC)—Loan Recovery and Asset Disposal Units Runkel
(FINSAC, n.d.c)  FINSAC. no date. “Asset Management and Divestment.” Financial Sector 
Adjustment Company. Accessed December 2, 2020.  
Web page explaining the function and organization of FINSAC’s asset management operations. 
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17325. 
(FINSAC, n.d.d)  FINSAC. no date. “Historical Background.” About FINSAC... Financial 
Sector Adjustment Company. Accessed December 2, 2020.  
Web page summarizing FINSAC’s official narrative of the Jamaican crisis.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17327. 
(FINSAC, n.d.e)  FINSAC. no date. “Loan Workout Policy.” Loan Recovery Unit. Financial 
Sector Adjustment Company. Accessed December 14, 2020.  
Web page enumerating FINSAC’s debt recovery policies.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17328. 
(FINSAC, n.d.f)  FINSAC. no date. “Non-Performing Loan Unit.” Loan Recovery Unit. 
Financial Sector Adjustment Company. Accessed January 8, 2021.  
Web page explaining the achievements and policies of FINSAC’s LRU.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17329. 
(FINSAC, n.d.g)  FINSAC. no date. “The Role of FINSAC.” About FINSAC... Financial Sector 
Adjustment Company. Accessed December 2, 2020.  
Web page outlining FINSAC’s mandate and governing philosophy.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17330. 
(Davies 1997a)  Davies, Omar. March 14, 1997. “Statement by the Minister of Finance.” 
Speech delivered at the Ministry of Finance and Planning.  
Statement justifying FINSAC and describing its board to Jamaica’s assembled press.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17332. 
(Davies 1997b)  Davies, Omar. March 27, 1997. “Statement on the Financial Sector 
Adjustment Company (FINSAC).” Speech delivered at the Budget Presentation by the 
Minister of Finance and Planning.  
Excerpt of speech by the minister of finance summarizing the legal authority, funding, and exit 
strategy of FINSAC.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17332. 
Reports/Assessments 
(Chen-Young 1998)  Chen-Young, Paul. November 1, 1998. “With All Good Intentions: The 
Collapse of Jamaica’s Financial Sector.” CSIS Americas Program. Policy Papers on the 
Americas, Vol. IX, Study 12.  




The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 2
(Escobar, Hilaire, Lukonga, Rado, and Schipke 1999)  Escobar, L.E., A. Hilaire, I. Lukonga, 
P. Rado, and A. Schipke. January 1999. “Jamaica: Selected Issues and Statistical Annex.” IMF 
Staff Country Report 99/2. IMF eLibrary.  
IMF report detailing specific features of the Jamaican economy, including the government’s 
response to the crisis.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/library/jamaica-selected-issues. 
(FINSAC 2002)  FINSAC. 2002. “Annual Report.”  
Summary listing the accomplishments and operations of the Loan Recovery Unit and Asset 
Disposal Unit.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17334. 
(World Bank 2000)  World Bank. November 2, 2000. “Report and Recommendation of the 
President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the Executive 
Directors on a Proposed Bank Restructuring & Debt Management Program Adjustment Loan 
in the Amount of US$75 Million to Jamaica.” Proposal 7397-JM. P071112.  
First World Bank loan proposal with summary of FINSAC’s activities.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17261. 
(World Bank 2001)  World Bank. December 21, 2001. “Implementation Completion Report 
on a Loan in the Amount of US$75 Million to Jamaica for a Bank Restructuring & Debt 
Management Program Adjustment Loan.” Implementation Completion Report 23336. 
P071112. 
First World Bank loan evaluation describing FINSAC’s debt-recovery progress.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17262. 
(World Bank 2002)  World Bank. September 17, 2002. “Report and Recommendation of the 
President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development to the Executive 
Directors on a Proposed Second Bank Restructuring & Debt Management Program 
Adjustment Loan in the Amount of US$75 Million to Jamaica.” Proposal 7527-JM. FSLT-
71500. 
Second World Bank loan proposal.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17263. 
(World Bank 2003)  World Bank. June 30, 2003. “Implementation Completion Report on a 
Loan in the Amount of US$75 Million to Jamaica for a Second Bank Restructuring & Debt 
Management Program Adjustment Loan.” Implementation Completion Report 26257. FSLT-
71500. 






Jamaica Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC)—Loan Recovery and Asset Disposal Units Runkel
(King 2000)  King, Damien. May 1, 2000. The Evolution of Structural Adjustment and 
Stabilization Policy in Jamaica. Reformas Económicas 65. Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean.  
Working paper evaluating decades-long trends in Jamaican macroeconomic policy.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17265. 
(Government of Jamaica 2003)  Government of Jamaica. December 1, 2003. “Annual 
Report Exhibit D.” EDGAR, Form 18-K, EX-99.(D), 53078/000126515203000005.  
Jamaica’s filing for the US Securities and Exchange Commission, describing how the 
government held FINSAC debt.  
https://ypfs.som.yale.edu/node/17267. 
Copyright 2021 © Yale University. All rights reserved. To order copies of this material or to 
receive permission to reprint any or all of this document, please contact the Yale Program on 
Financial Stability at ypfs@yale.edu. 
356
The Journal of Financial Crises Vol. 3 Iss. 2
